THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER ENGLISH LAW. By
DAwn FELLMAN. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin
Press. 1966. Pp. 130. $4.00.
I do not know what personal experience Mr. Fellman has of British
courts and institutions. It must be considerable; for I would not think
it possible to write with such authority and accuracy about such
sensitive questions as the defendant's rights without having been
closely involved one's self. At least that is what I find whenever I
try to deal with any questions of American law.
Defendant's Rights is a survey of the various stages of a criminal
prosecution in England. It begins with an account of the English
criminal courts which is commendably short and concise. Points of
detail which I would like to raise by way of comment are these:
(1) Where there is an appeal from a magistrate's court to
Quarter Sessions, the appeal is heard without a jury (p. 8). This is
so because either the offence is a summary offence (i.e., one where
the defendant is not entitled to a jury trial), or an indictable offence
which the defendant has elected to have tried summarily. Thus, the
defendant either had no right to a jury, or he chose to forego it.
(2) Mr. Fellman explains that "either party may ask the Court
of Quarter Sessions to have a case stated for the opinion of the High
Court" on legal questions. Later he says, "in addition, appeal to
Quarter Sessions may be abandoned by taking an appeal directly from
a magistrate's court to the High Court on a point of law" (p. 9).
The meaning of this is not clear, at least not to me. There need be no
"abandonment" of any appeal to Quarter Sessions. The defendant has
a choice either of appeal to Quarter Sessions on a point of law or
fact, and a retrial of the whole issue without a jury; or, he may, as
the prosecution may also, state a case for the High Court. "Stating
a case" means that the parties agree upon the facts and make a
statement of them for the opinion of the High Court upon a point of
law. It is then like a student's moot court argument.
(3) I have no reason to doubt the statement that the magistrates'
courts "handle about 97% of all the criminal cases in England and
Wales" (p. 5). However, these figures should be viewed in perspective, for they include every minor traffic infraction, including
4parking," all of which, until recently, have been dealt with by prose247
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cution through the ordinary courts. Since 1960,1 it has been possible
for local authorities to adopt a procedure for collecting "ticket fines"
for certain minor traffic offences. The offender has the option of
paying a fixed sum to the clerk of the court's office, or of submitting
to prosecution in the ordinary way. I do not know how many jurisdictions have adopted this procedure, but in 1964 my information was
that about thirty cities had done so. Hopefully, this practice will
increase.
(4) Since the publication of the book, legislative action has been
taken upon the recommendation (mentioned by Mr. Fellman on
p. 127, footnote 39) that the Court of Criminal Appeal should be
replaced by a new Division of the Court of Appeal.2
Chapters II-VI, which form the main body of the book, cover a
selection of matters of absorbing interest to the lawyer, sociologist
and to any intelligent layman. I think they should all be mentioned
here, and I cannot do better than to list them from the table of
contents.
Chapter II. "The Preliminaries" (Arrest, Bail, Prosecution).
Chapter III. "The Police and the Accused" (Police Interrogation, Confessions, Searches and Seizures, Use of Wrongfully Secured Evidence, Habeas Corpus).
Chapter IV. "The Right to a Fair Trial" (Some Elements of a
Fair Trial, Public Trial, The Concept of Natural Justice, Right to
Counsel, Double Jeopardy).
Chapter V. "Conduct of the Trial" (The Jury, Comment by the
Judge).
Chapter VI. "An Evaluation."
These are all matters which are currently the subject of much heartsearching in both countries. I would like to take up Mr. Fellman's
discussions of each of these topics, but space forbids. It is most helpful
to learn of the methods used abroad, provided the differences in the
background of the problem are fully understood, and this is where
Mr. Bellman's presentation is so good. He possesses a keen ability to
explain to American readers the essential differences between the
English and American approaches to these questions. Questions of
basic rights, individual freedoms, due process and the like are not
"constitutional questions" in England. There is no basic constitutional
law; as Dicey said, "the general principles of the constitution (as
for example the right to personal liberty or the right of public
1 Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act, 1960. 8 & 9 Eliz., 26.63.
2 Criminal Appeal Act, 1966. Citation not available at this time.
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meeting) are with us the result of judicial decisions determining the
rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the
courts." 3 Many of the ideas of individual freedom and protection
against the State, which are now a part of the American Constitution
and the amendments thereto, originated in the English common law.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus is an ancient and obvious example. In
England, the enjoyment of these rights is always subject to the wish
of the sovereign Legislature, whose enactments no court can question.
Habeas Corpus can be suspended, and all individual rights taken
away by the Legislature. However, such things have only happened
in the modern era in times of grave national crisis, the obvious
examples being the two World Wars.4 English people are not worried
about the safety of their "due process" rights, since their maintenance
in times of peace is so strongly supported both by the Courts and the
Legislature. Nevertheless, the Legislature could take them away if
it decided to do so. All that the courts could do then would be to
construe the legislation in the manner most favorable to the individual and in a manner consistent with the courts' ideas of natural
justice; (p. 75 et. seq.) but the courts could not defy the words of
the Legislature in the end. But as I say, the Legislature does not act
in that way, and we continue to assume that it will not. The basic
difference in approach relates to the question whether you prefer the
ultimate decision in a democratic state to rest with appointed Supreme
Court judges, or with the elected representatives of the people.
Mr. Fellman also deals with the rights of the individual in respect
of police procedures, the right to bail, and the right to counsel. Again,
in England, these are not questions of constitutional law. The awarding of bail, as Mr. Fellman points out, depends very much on the
discretion of the court. The right to counsel is based upon statutory
provision for legal aid, and again there is much scope for the
exercise of the court's discretion in granting it. Confessions and admissions are controlled by the rule that they are only admissible if
made "voluntarily" (p. 45); however, confessions may still be
excluded on the ground that they were, in the view of the judge,
unfairly or improperly obtained. In exercising this discretion, the
judge takes into account whether or not the statements were made in
accordance with the Judge's Rules-rules laid down ex cathedra by
the judges for the conduct of the police in conducting investigations.
3 DicEy, THE LAW OF THE CONsTrruTION, 195.

4 Liversidge v. Anderson, (1942)

A.C. 206.
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Observance of the rules is no guarantee of admissibility, and vice
versa, for the judge again has a broad discretion.
These are all problems that American courts have had to meet and
solve, and they have done so according to the construction they have
placed upon the provisions of the Constitution. In England, the
problems are similar but the context for solution is very different. As
I have said, England has no constitutional guarantees; England is
content to leave a broad discretion in the judge, who, as Mr. Fellman
points out, occupies a position of the highest respect. The problem,
as Mr. Fellman says, is "to find a correct balance between the needs
of the police and the requirements of a fair trial." Many in England
would take the view that such a balance cannot be laid down in a
precise rule to be applied to every situation. Discretion is inevitable
in many parts of the judicial system, and it is arguable at least that
the best solution to these grave problems is to leave a discretion in
the persons most properly equipped to exercise it fairly and impartially.
There are other differences which might be mentioned. When Mr.
Fellman speaks of the idea of a fair trial, it is interesting to note that
there is no "D.A." system in England; barristers are accustomed to
appear in one case on behalf of the prosecution, and in another case
on behalf of the defense. Indeed, at Oxford Quarter Sessions, I have
seen the same two barristers appearing in successive cases, but they
change sides. This system is thought to provide an added assurance of
a fair presentation of the prosecution's case, because the prosecuting
lawyer is not "prosecution minded," and his career does not depend
on the number of convictions during the year.
Although there is provision for challenging prospective jurors,
England has never developed the American practice of examining
a juror in order to establish a cause for challenge.
The peremptory challenge is not in practice used; and, although the
opportunity to challenge is thought to be an important guarantee of
an impartial jury, it is thought that the fairest thing to do is to accept
the jury as it comes.
We know very little of the workings of juries in England, yet
there is much concern about their operation. The Times in July disclosed some interesting statements by recent jurors: "A Jewish woman
whose family had been in a concentration camp swore that she would
never send anyone to prison. A man who had himself been in gaol
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(prison) agreed with her, saying he too would never convict anybody..."; and another who reportedly said, "I don't like the police,
and I'll never convict anyone."
These are unusual cases and could possibly have been avoided by
examining the jurors before the trial. The whole jury problem is a
very serious one--a collection of local people is asked to listen to
and concentrate for several days on all the details of a complicated
story, on speeches by counsel and the summing up by the judge. It
is probably the longest effort of intellectual concentration of their
lives and takes place in a strange environment. The jury decision is
often a matter of chance. It is paradoxical that so much effort is
made to ensure the fairness and efficiency of so many aspects of the
trial, but the crucial decision has to be left to such an unqualified
group of people. I am not being overly critical, for I appreciate the
importance of having the ultimate question decided by someone who
is not part of the Government; and too, I have no better solution to
offer. 5
Mr. Fellman also discusses the thorny problem of the unpaid
non-lawyer magistrates. I will not go into this in any detail, having
had a previous opportunity to say something. 6 In defence of the lay
magistrates, however, it should be appreciated that their lack of
legal expertise need not be a serious handicap. At that level, few
points of law arise; when they do, a competent clerk of the court is
there to advise them (and I agree of course that the system does
require a good clerk). Far more often than questions of law, there
are questions of fact. In determining questions of fact, it is very
arguable that the magistrates are the best body available. They sit in
threes or fives, and there is certainly an advantage in having more
than a single person (as is the case with a stipendiary magistrate) to
decide issues of fact. Magistrates can at least be assumed to be persons
of some intelligence and integrity; if their critics will not accept even
that, I insist that, on balance, they are not inferior in these qualities
to the average jury. Since, however, a large proportion of the cases
coming before magistrates come on guilty pleas, the main questions
for the magistrates to decide are those of disposal. Perplexing and
difficult as these questions are, my own experience of magistrates,
recorders and chairman of Quarter Sessions indicates that the magistrates, on the average, know as much or more about the penal and
5 For the best study of the jury, see
(1966).
6 18 U. MiAm L.REv. 517 (1964).
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treatment institutions as do the professional lawyers. The magistrates
visit them much more often, and are better informed about local
conditions, and they certainly take great trouble over the question
of finding the best, or perhaps the least inappropriate, sentence.
Recently a scheme has been introduced which requires a magistrate
to take certain training in law and procedure before sitting; and it is
interesting to note also that the judges have been holding a number
of conferences and exercises on sentencing.
In short, The Defendant'sRights Under English Law is excellently
written and produced. There are one or two minor errors-Miss
Wootton is a Baroness, J. B. Priestley is spelled wrong, there is a
misprint on p. 17, and my good friend, D. Seaborne Davies, Professor
of Law at the University of Liverpool will hardly recognize himself
under two other references as D. S. Davies (p. 117), and D. R. S.
Davies (p. 118). And a table of cases would be helpful.
This small book is an excellent presentation of the English law
and practice on a number of questions of crucial importance both to
England and to the United States. It is most informative, and well
supported by authority. It should be both an exposition to the nonspecialist, and an ap6rtif to those who wish to know more. It will
be of interest to, and enjoyed by, the general reader in addition to the
professional. And if I may add a personal note, it would be one of
regret that I heard of the book in August and not in June; for I had
the pleasure of teaching a course on English and American Penology
at the University of San Diego School of Law this past Summer. The
book would have been ideal. If I should be invited again, it will be
assigned as compulsory reading.
R. H.
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